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Reviews

Henning Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe. Enlarging NATO and the European Union* (New York: Palgrave, 2002)

***Reviewed by* James Sperling, Political Science, University of Akron**

Many analysts of German foreign policy have seized upon the idea that Germany represents a "civilian power," particularly since the role of a great power or even a power of middle rank defined militarily has been largely proscribed by history, treaty, conscience, and self-interest. In its initial formulation, the concept of civilian power performed the important function of explaining how Germany could wield influence without recourse to military power. Over time, civilian power has unaccountably become transformed into a mechanism for recasting the debate about German exceptionalism in the postwar period. The German foreign policy elite is assumed to have adopted the three cardinal virtues of civilian power: the willingness to share sovereignty with supranational institutions; an unwillingness to employ military force in the pursuit of national objectives; and the rejection of balance of power politics in favor of the rule of law, defined as a "civilianized" international politics.

In this timely book, Henning Tewes poses two important questions: how would unification affect Germany's role as a civilian power? Would the stabilizing roles played by the European Union (EU) and NATO in western Europe during the postwar period be extended to central and eastern Europe in the post-cold war period? Tewes finds that a unified Germany has continued along the pathway of a civilian power and that Germany's policies towards the EU

and NATO enlargements were intended to stabilize (and "civilianize") central and eastern Europe.

Henning's model of foreign policy analysis has two components. The first addresses the vexing level of analysis problem: the changed structure of power in the European state system expanded the range of foreign policy choice confronting the foreign policy elite in a unified Germany, while the domestic institutional and historical memory constraining and impelling that foreign policy elite circumscribed the range of foreign policy choice. Henning's model of foreign policy clearly favors an "inside/out" logic, but his analysis of the enlargement debates is not always disciplined by that logic. The second component integrates role theory into the civilian power framework, particularly the role played by identity in the definition of interest. While the subordination of material interest to questions of identity is consistent with the constructivist project, Henning is–unlike others who assert the eliding of the German and European identity–refreshingly blunt in his discussion of the German *staatsraison*, particularly enlargement as a means to achieve German prosperity and security. The narrative in *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe* is driven by a typology of roles–role performance (patterned state behavior), external and internal role expectations, and elite role conceptions or beliefs about (in)appropriate behavior–and by the problem of role conflict resolution, particularly the process of role merger.

Three sets of role conflicts beset the German foreign policy elite. The first role conflict, which plagued policy towards EU enlargement, was between Germany's role as an integration deepener and an integration widener. Henning details the internal contradictions of the German insistence that Europe could widen and deepen simultaneously and provides a persuasive interpretation of how Germany, in the end, merged both roles. The governments of Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder guaranteed that the deepening of the EU via EMU preceded the eastern enlargement, while eastern enlargement preceded the institutional reform necessary for deepening (and effective enlargement). The second role conflict was between the imperatives and constraints of Atlanticism and Gaullism that plagued not only the decision to enlarge NATO, but the EU as well. Henning is careful not to pigeonhole individuals within the German foreign policy elite as either Atlanticists or Gaullists, but

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rather suggests that any German government had to meet the demands of both capitols. The solution to this particular conflict was resolved along the lines evident during the postwar period: on matters pertaining to NATO, German interests were best served by hewing to an Atlanticist orientation (the rapid expansion of NATO); on matters pertaining to the EU, Germany's interests were best served by not alienating Paris. The intersection of these two role conflicts were played out by the third general category of conflict: the contradictory demands placed on Germany by Moscow and Warsaw. The most creative aspect of Henning's book is the interplay of the contradictory demands placed on German policy by Moscow (no enlargement of NATO) and by Warsaw (enlargement of NATO and EU). Henning's narrative leads to an inescapable conclusion: these three sets of role conflict were most easily merged by adherence to the roles of integration widener, Atlanticism, and Warshavism.

Henning derives three hypotheses from his discussion of Germany as a civilian power and the fifteen (!) principles constituting the German foreign policy culture: first, the postwar commitment to deepening would take precedence over widening the EU; second, Atlanticism would continue to dominate Gaullism in security affairs; and third, the conflict between Atlanticists and Muscovites would sharpen over the question of NATO enlargement. It remains unclear to me how the first hypothesis could be derived (or its confirmation expected) from the foreign policy principle that a civilian power would seek "the civilianization, stabilization, and multilateralization of East Central Europe [and] would therefore have to embark upon the course of institutional extension" (48).

Henning concludes his discussion by noting that the EU and NATO continue to be a part of a unified Germany's *staatsraison.* He also claims that the enlargement process for both the EU and NATO followed a German design. Such a claim naturally leads to the question: how did Germany get its way? Henning's answer is a relatively simple one: "Germany's sheer size makes it difficult for Germany's partners to resist an important German objective" (201). Were either portion of that statement unconditionally verifiable, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that Germany is in fact a "normal power."

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Andreas Huyssen, *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003)

***Reviewed by* Eric Langenbacher, Government, Georgetown University**

Refining and updating his previous book, *Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia*, Andreas Huyssen has published an outstanding collection of ten essays of varying lengths that combine theoretical insights into collective memory with outstanding case studies–ranging from Colombian artist Doris Salcedo, to the haunted landscape of Berlin, to Buenos Aires' memorial to Argentina's "dirty war," and the twin towers in New York City. Conceptually, *Presents Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory* centers on the current ubiquity of collective memory that has resulted in a veritable crisis of history, but also, increasingly, a fatigue with memory itself. This increasingly global, musealized, and mediatized culture of memory is not simply a functional compensation for the loss of *lieux de memoire*, as authors such as Pierre Nora and Hermann Lübbe have argued. Instead, the current surfeit of memory has many causes, such as the increasing pace of global technological change, the interpretive turn that privileges "presentist" interpretations, and the rise of the Holocaust as "a cipher for the twentieth century as a whole" and "a universal trope for historical trauma," (13) which has sensitized many societies towards human rights but which may also lead to a de-emphasis of specific traumas.

More important are two larger trends. On the one hand, this memory epidemic is a consequence of "the past … selling better than the future" (20), but such entertainment memory and popular cultural representations are not to be lamented, à la Theodor Adorno's dated culture industry thesis. In addition to being largely unavoidable, commodification is an indication of the second development. With the decline of high modernist linear and teleological narratives came distrust in the future and a concomitant escape into the past (the shift from present futures to present pasts). Our postmodern world has developed a new sense of malaise and melancholia despite a highly lauded rootlessness or border crossing and a widespread acceptance of the complexity of the past with its multi-

ple layers, voids, and absences: "Our own discontents flow instead from information and perpetual overload combined with a cultural acceleration that neither our psyche nor our senses are adequately equipped to handle" (25). Memories have arisen to compensate, but, ultimately, postmodern heterogeneity and sociopolitical fragmentation make this response functionally unfulfilling. Grossly exaggerated hopes have been placed in memory, which cannot be a panacea.

All of these contemporary strains have affected cultural representations around the globe, exemplified by the rebuilding of Berlin as the capital of unified Germany. Despite the desire of conservatives to critically reconstruct the city as it presumably once was, to center the city and to make it an attractive destination for the image conscious city tourist and urban vacationer, the city necessarily is filled with multiple voids and palimpsests. It is "the capital site of a discontinuous, ruptured history … saturated with memories" (53), always in a state of becoming. One of the only projects that captures Berlin's postmodern reality is Daniel Libeskind's Jewish museum with its explicit representation of voids. This globally resonant representational form, a wound cut into the earth, also informs the planned memory park for the victims of the dirty war in Buenos Aires and the art of Colombian artist Doris Salcedo. Her *Unland* works against the destruction of the past, while simultaneously expressing skepticism regarding public memory and direct historical representation. *The Orphans' Tunic,* consisting of two forcefully combined tables inlaid with human hair and a silk covering, emphasizes the lingering effects of societal trauma. It "is the obverse of utopia, a land where even 'normal' life with all of its contradictions, pains and promises, happiness and miseries has become unlivable" (112). Other trends in memory are evident in the Times Square redevelopment in New York. The clean, crisp redevelopment captures the nostalgia of the present. It is "almost already tradition" (87), but it also turns the old high/low brow dichotomy on its head, combining the clean suburban aesthetic with an edgy, marginal and urban one. The commodified image is everything today, and the city must be rearticulated to accommodate these "aesthetic spaces for cultural consumption" (89).

Turning to the three longest and most fascinating essays, the first extends Huyssen's insights into monumental seduction in Germany. In the postwar period, there was a deliberate antifascist, antimonu-

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mentalism, an aesthetic consensus that stressed either the invisibility of monuments or the inherent fascism in nineteenth-century kitsch monumentalism. Today, however, these notions need to be rethought, not just because there seems to be an irrepressible desire for the monumental but also because there is "a democratic conviction that there is a legitimate desire for monumental public space" (46). Monumentalism is thus both seductive and progressive. Several memory events in the summer of 1995 exhibited these dynamics with the general theme of monumental redemption through memory, love, and forgetting. The Bayreuth festival emphasized emancipation through love and provides Huyssen with an opportunity to return to the influential theories of Richard Wagner. Wagner, rebelling against the ossified monumental art of both the classical Greeks and the historicism of the nineteenth-century nation state, propagated an alternative, which was marked by the nineteenth-century search for origins and, through the notion of the *Gesamtkunstwerk*, was a harbinger of both genocidal and progressive futures. Wagner's search for the creative and new was predicated "on a world in ruins, not in the future, but deep in the past" (43), so that the new is always already a tomb, a memorial to failure and disaster. This emphasis on the necessity and centrality of destruction presaged the Nazis, but also points to a more progressive if paradoxical monumental sensibility. Such postmodern monumentalism stresses the transitory and ephemeral media event, epitomized by Christo's wrapping of the Reichstag in Berlin that was simultaneously monumental and antimonumental.

The essay on Art Spiegelman's comic masterpiece *Maus* delves into debates over appropriate representations of the Holocaust still dominated by Adorno's culture-industry thesis. He notes that "politically, most everybody seems to agree, the genocide of the Jews is to be remembered … by as large a public as possible, but mass cultural representations are not considered proper or correct" (124), so that Steven Spielberg's art is deemed inappropriate in comparison to the work of a documentary filmmaker such as Claude Lanzmann. This widespread modernist dichotomy that contrasts mass culture with high art needs to be rethought in light of *Maus,* ironically using Adorno's thought on the multivalence of mimesis. *Maus*, jarring and ambiguous throughout, is ultimately opaque regarding the success of enlightenment. Rather, the knotting or crosscutting between past

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and present reveals the captivity of the present by the past and the simultaneity of identity and nonidentity. Spiegelman's mimetic approximation is accessible, appropriate, and uniquely capable of representing nonverbal forms of communication. *Maus* works both for and against the dominant memory culture in complex ways that get at the unassimilability of traumatic memory and that attempt to escape the terror of memory through reproducing it. His successful "strategies of narration thus maintain the insuperable tension within mimetic approximation between closeness and distance, affinity and difference" (133).

Perhaps the most brilliant essay is on W.G. Sebald and the literature regarding the air war against German cities in World War II. Huyssen observes a peculiar postwar German obsession with and partisan debate over new beginnings (*Wenden*), which are a kind of repetition compulsion dealing simultaneously with memory and forgetting. Discussions of German suffering in the air war were, along with the Holocaust, widespread from the outset of the postwar period so that the repression thesis advanced by Sebald in *Luftkrieg und Literatur* is largely misplaced even if some postwar authors showed some signs of posttraumatic avoidance. Sebald's perspective is largely a consequence of his secondary traumatization, having been greatly affected by but not having directly experienced the bombings. His writing is thus repetitive and palimpsestic, living off memory, reinscription, and reinterpretation. An overriding pessimism also permeates Sebald, who asserts that "it is as if history itself has been bombed into oblivion" (155), necessitating an alternative narrative, a natural history of destruction. Yet all is not as bleak as Sebald asserts:

> At its deepest level, the German discourse of turning points from 1945 on can be read as a symptom of such multi-layered traumatic experiences, which always leave something unresolved and in need of further articulation. After every turn, it seems, the past returns only to generate the desire for the next turn … Since every repetition differs from the last, there is movement in public memory, a movement not towards resolution or even redemption, but toward acknowledgment and recognition" (146).

Maria Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002)

***Reviewed by* Atina Grossmann, Humanities and Social Sciences, Cooper Union, New York**

Maria Höhn's marvelous study, *GIs and Fräuleins*, about 1950s West Germany is a highly original, cogently argued, and lively study of the transformation of postwar and post-Nazi society in the wake of US occupation. The book details the complicated and at times quite unexpected interactions among German villagers, US military personnel, and eastern European Jewish displaced persons in the Rhineland Palatinate, an area that had been briefly controlled by the United States in 1945, then occupied by the French, and restored to American control in 1951 as the cold war proceeded and the Korean War raged. Drawing on her both affectionate and jaundiced "inside knowledge" as a native of the area, as well as a prodigious array of archival, oral history, and popular culture sources, Höhn has produced a densely researched case study of the vast and rapid changes brought by the American presence and the contradictory responses these changes evoked in the garrison towns of Kaiserslautern and Baumholder. Ever sensitive to her own youthful enthusiasm and bewilderment at the peacetime invasion of over 100,000 *Amis*, and armed with privileged access to town archives and officials, she examines the simultaneous fascination and horror generated by American "democratization" programs, popular culture, and the lure of the dollar.

Höhn dissects with great sophistication the class, race, ethnic, and gender components of those responses and how they changed over the decade, always taking care to present a variety of voices ranging from a local communist deputy to the morally outraged pastor to black GIs fondly remembering their tours of duty. A great strength of this volume it that moves us beyond the many breathless discussions by titillated journalists of "fraternization" and the German-American encounter "between the sheets" in the immediate postwar period (recently usefully analyzed by Petra Goede in her book on *GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations 1945-1949).*[1]

Höhn focuses on a later period when memories of defeat and denazification are fading, the cold war is in full gear, and the Americans have become an ubiquitous presence, indeed more visible and integrated than they would be from the 1960s onward when the occupiers were likely to have retreated behind the gates of their bases. At times, probably channeling her own excited childhood memories, she herself waxes a bit breathless about the sudden American "gold rush." But without denying the force of that experience for Germans of her generation, she offers a compelling portrait of a society seeking to reinvent–and being forced to restructure–itself in the wake of the devastating war and genocide it had produced.

Key to this analysis is an awareness of race and gender politics. Complementing and extending the work of scholars such as Elizabeth Heineman and Heide Fehrenbach, Höhn includes in her discussion of race and gender not only the shadow of the Final Solution but more contemporary resentments against the eastern European "displaced person" (DP) survivors who formed the core of the postwar West German Jewish community. Indeed, Höhn's book is the first major study not primarily focused on Jews or German-Jewish relations to integrate successfully the impact of the "historic triangle" of Germans, Jews, and Americans in postwar occupied Germany[2] and to demonstrate, rather than simply assert, "The complex interaction of German racism and anti-semitism" after the war (221). American as well as German racism is central to her story, and she is careful to distinguish between a discredited (if certainly lingering) form of National Socialist racial order and antisemitism, and a later version addressed toward disreputable "foreigners" such as Jewish bar owners and the African-American GIs and the (often also outsider) German *Frauleins* to whom they catered. Anti-black sentiment was not the same as Nazi racism, and prejudice toward DP bar owners was different than the exterminatory antisemitism of the Third Reich, although neither could be dislodged from the contexts of recent history.

Höhn analyzes the complicated process by which the "American dilemma" of race and Jim Crow policies was imported to a post-Nazi West Germany with its own quite different history of racial politics. The US occupation served to define and delimit German notions of national identity, and notions about "race"–in its various permuta-

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tions–were central to that shifting national identity. She traces changing German perceptions of, and relations with, black American soldiers, from an initial friendly fascination to the increasing marginalization that accompanied West German national and economic recovery. In the process, Höhn also tells us a great deal about American race relations, particularly as they played out in the military. She pays particular attention to the growing influence of the Civil Rights movement in the United States on American deployments in Germany, and how in turn, local Germans responded to these shifts in US policy and practice. Germans in these garrison towns, it turns out, proved surprisingly hospitable to dramatic changes in their small town life, eager to take advantage of the economic opportunities and cultural diversions offered by their new neighbors, astonishingly unperturbed by the carving up of their farmland for barracks and airfields. In part, this may have been, as Höhn astutely suggests, because National Socialism had already disturbed their placid *Heimat*, bringing in workers to construct the *Westwall* and *Wehrmacht* troops to guard the western frontier, and then foreign forced laborers who accustomed locals to the presence of outsiders. At the same time, Höhn shows that the social upheavals of both Weimar and the Nazi years, as well as postwar economic expediency, had loosened sexual mores to the point that even in the supposedly repressive 1950s liaisons between local women and GIs were not necessarily stigmatized. But she also insists that the 1950s Americanization "was not just a continuation of a process of modernization begun in the 1930s." (19)

GIs and Frauleins offers more evidence that the 1950s, unreconstructed as they were in terms of seriously confronting responsibility for National Socialism and the Holocaust, were hardly uniformly repressive or silent. As the decade proceeded, Höhn persuasively argues, German-American liaisons became increasingly acceptable and moral outrage was narrowed and targeted primarily toward African-American soldiers and their "outsider" sexual partners or girlfriends, often expellees who fled from the Red Army and the eastern zone. Indeed, for many (especially but not only young) Germans in "the fantastic fifties," the American GIs in their midst offered an "alluring glimpse at the brave and admirable world of jazz, rock and roll, flashy cars, and consumer riches." (8) Moreover,

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American military authorities were intent on winning German goodwill and, lacking sufficient base housing, did not, at least initially, seek to segregate all troops from local inhabitants. From very different directions and political viewpoints, Germans ultimately accepted, emulated, and reworked the more "relaxed" consumption and behavior patterns modeled by the GIs. If conservatives abhorred sexual laxity while embracing anti-Communism, Social Democrats and (before their party was banned) Communists supported American challenges to clerical moralism while trying to exploit resentment of US military intrusions. Strikingly, however, ultimately virtually all groupings, from right to left, came to accept, often welcome, and sometimes even delight in, at least aspects, whether cultural or economic, of what has come to be called Americanization. Germans in the Rhineland-Palatinate picked and chose those elements of which they disapproved, and thereby shifted the boundaries of the respectable. By the end of the decade, Höhn notes "even the clergy" and other conservatives recognized that "it was no longer politically viable...to reject the American model as completely unsuitable." (174f.) Indeed, one measure of this consensus among occupier and occupied was more open stigmatization of disturbing outsiders, such as African-Americans, eastern European Jewish displaced persons, and sexually suspect women (often refugees from the east). Rather than seeking to prove how harmless these actors were, Höhn depicts them as active agents in their own right; black soldiers took their cue from the confrontations in Little Rock, Jewish bar owners actually organized economic self-defense associations, and women engaged in interracial relationships despite intense local and military police harassment.

Although her focus is solidly on the 1950s, Höhn deepens our understanding of the German confrontation with its Nazi past by analyzing the ways in which the encounter with US racism allowed Germans to "normalize" their own racist history. Germans' experience with black GIs, and how they were treated by both Germans and Americans, offered Germans a way of thinking about race that did not explicitly implicate Jews and antisemitism, allowed them to showcase a new tolerance superior to that practiced by the segregated army of their occupiers, and even offered perverse opportunities to identify as fellow victims of the United States. But ironically,

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as Höhn brilliantly points out, Jews and antisemitism, as well as the guilty memory of German racism and the Holocaust, were still conspicuously present, inscribed in the tattoo on the arm of the Jewish bar owner in Helmut Käutner's 1961 film, *Schwarzer Kies* (even if protests from nervous Jewish organizations initially resulted in the scene being edited out), or in even older images of "The Black Horror on the Rhine" circulated in response to German defeat and French occupation after World War I. Unabashed Jim Crow in the US military offered conservatives the opportunity to rationalize their own distaste for the "other" while reinforcing anti-Americanism on the left. The presence of the Americans pushed Germans to renegotiate, not entirely reinvent, their relationship to change and "foreign" influence. Höhn's case here is immeasurably strengthened by her ability to track these changes in consciousness and practice over time, thanks to her juxtaposition of contemporary communal, church, press, and popular culture sources with later memoirs and oral and video histories.

Ultimately, the presence of "non-white" US military personnel is part of, and foreshadows, the increasingly multicultural character of West German society, starting in the 1960s and intensifying after 1989, even as the Americans increasingly–and to a good deal of local consternation–scaled down their operations. The 1950s ambivalence toward American materialism and "tempo" among both right and left parties drew on older, especially interwar, traditions of both anti-Americanism and Americanization. In Höhn's narrative, it also illuminates current anxieties about American-style multiculturalism and rampant capitalism untempered by a more or less ethnically homogenous welfare state. Her nuanced account of the "multilayered" and historically overdetermined relationships between (themselves non-homogenous) victorious occupiers, defeated occupied, and assorted refugees becomes, of course, all the more suggestive in the context of the current much more vexed American effort to gain control and win hearts and minds in a quite different occupied nation.

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Notes

1. Petra Goede, *Gis and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations 1945-1949* (New Haven, 2003). Among the many contemporary sources see Julian Bach Jr., *America's Germany. An Account of the Occupation* (New York: Random House, 1946), especially "GIs Between the Sheets," pp. 71-83; Bud Hutton and Andy Rooney, *Conquerors' Peace. A Report to the American Stockholders* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, New York 1947); Hans Habe, *Our Love Affair with Germany* (New York: Putnam, 1953).
2. See Frank Stern, "The Historic Triangle: Occupiers, Germans and Jews in Postwar Germany," Robert G. Moeller, ed. *West Germany under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer* Era (Ann Arbor, 1997), 199-230. For another fine collection about attitudes towards race, gender and Americanization in the 1950s, see Hannah Schissler, ed, *The Miracle Years: A Culrural History of West Germany 1949-1968* (Princeton, 2001).

James McAllister, *No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954,* Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002)

***Reviewed by* Robert Gerald Livingston, German Historical Institute, Washington, DC**

It is exciting, and also fun, to read this dense but concise study by James McAllister, an assistant professor of Political Science at Williams College–exciting because he deals with fateful decisions about political power in Europe right after World War II, and fun because he lays about so lustily in arguing his case, which meshes international relations theory with diplomatic history. Be they orthodox, revisionist, or postrevisionist historians of the early cold war, mighty neorealist political theorists like Kenneth Waltz (the favorite target), or much-honored biographers like Robert Dallek, few escape skewering if their analysis seems "flawed," their "evidence does not support [their] conclusions," or "none of [their] testable hypotheses … stands up to the historical evidence."

At the heart of McAllister's theoretical case is his assertion that the right way to view power relations in Europe during the first postwar decade is not, as Waltz and almost all historians have, as a bipolar but a tripolar contest. Besides the two power poles of the United

States and the Soviet Union loomed in American policy makers' minds and strategies a third pole–Germany. To be sure, this was not the defeated, weak Germany of 1945 but a pole of potential power, the Germany of twenty-thirty years later. For these policy makers, how to control that future Germany was, McAllister argues, the decisive question of the postwar world.

For longer than is customarily realized, this question provided an incentive to preserve wartime American-Soviet cooperation, which generals Lucius Clay, the influential American military governor, and Dwight D. Eisenhower wanted to give every chance. Quickly, however, the administration of Harry S. Truman settled upon another answer to the question: abandonment of the idea of a unified Germany and establishment instead of a West German state integrated into a West European entity. Much of McAllister's book is devoted to explaining how that answer dashed Washington's hopes of withdrawing American military forces from Europe and why it became a strong advocate of a European Defense Community (EDC) that would contain a new West German army, which was deemed essential once the Korean War of 1950 raised public fears of a Soviet attack (fears that, McAllister shows, Eisenhower did not at all share). Henceforth there would be "no exit" for American troops from Europe. And it is only today, fifty-three years later, that the Pentagon has begun to pull them out.

Tightly organized into six chapters and 264 pages, the account is admirably helped by frequent summaries. In fact, the author's main arguments against the neorealists can be found in four pages (248-52): American policymakers did not really believe the Soviet Union would embark on further expansion in Europe; they assumed American forces would be brought home relatively soon; they saw the structural problem of German power as crucial; and they came to realize that this potential power made the bipolar system much more complex than they first assumed. McAllister is eminently fair in presenting the pros and cons of the time and of hindsight on the vital issues (did Stalin ever really favor a unified Germany?) and then in drawing his own conclusions. He has mastered all the sources, at least all the American and most British ones (few if any German or French, though): OSS, State Department, and other official reports, the private papers of statesmen, politicians, and occupation officials

of the time, and a vast range of secondary books and scholarly journal articles on every aspect of American occupation policy. He neatly exposes the self-serving in memoirists' recollections.

Pausing occasionally to flail misguided political theorists and historians, McAllister gives us a classical, detailed diplomatic history that traces the evolving views of how to deal with the Soviet Union and Germany on the part of presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower, secretaries of state James Byrnes, George Marshall, Dean Acheson, and John Foster Dulles, diplomatic planners such as Robert Murphy and George Kennan, generals such as Clay, and prominent occupation officials, such as John J. McCloy. Every serious student of American policy toward Germany should read this account. In it Jimmy Byrnes emerges as a decisive figure, who as early as the Potsdam conference in the summer of 1945 rejected the idea of a unified German economy and who in the fall of 1946, in his Stuttgart speech, signaled the way toward a separate West German state. McAllister delights in identifying policy makers' reversals of position, the most ironic of which perhaps was that of George Kennan, whose influence in 1947 and 1948 was immense: just when he had convinced the Washington establishment of the merit of containing the Soviets and establishing a West German state, he himself switched to advocating negotiations with Moscow on unification. Alas for him, he had done his previous work too well. Kennan's new arguments were rejected by Acheson and almost everyone in the Washington policy-making community, and he was soon marginalized.

McAllister falls short on one count, however, and comes up short on a second: Germany and the Germans are nowhere to be found. The country seems in this book to be some ectoplasmic apparition with which the statespeople and diplomats must contend. Even if their state was a political nullity in the first year or so of occupation, both the Soviet Union and the United States began as early as the autumn of 1946 to bid for the allegiance of the German people. Earlier that year, Stalin sought by fusing the communist KPD with the social democratic SPD to create a political party that he imagined would attract Germans in both east and west. As time went along, the attitudes of Germans became an important factor for those Americans who had to decide whether abandonment of support for

a unified Germany would lead to a nationalistic backlash among Germans and create a susceptibility among them to blandishments from the Soviet Union. A few background pages on the condition of the country, Germans'state of mind, and the domestic political forces that were emerging would have provided the reader with a fuller picture of the landscape within which Soviet and American leaders played their diplomatic game. This omission assumes greater relevance for the period after 1949, when German political figures such as Konrad Adenauer and Kurt Schumacher started to exercise influence. If Germany during the period of 1945-1954 truly represented the third power, even if only a potential one, and not merely a political corpse on which American and Soviet leaders were hacking away, its treatment in this book is inadequate.

Even odder is why McAllister stops his narrative with the August 1954 defeat in the French National Assembly of the EDC, that "beautiful and noble dream for Eisenhower and Dulles" designed to contain German power, provide protection for western Europe, and permit the American army to pull out. His book should have included an extra chapter to close the circle, to describe how the very next year West Germany was brought into a military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which reconciled the first two aims (but, of course, not the third), which, unlike any alliance before it, has continued long after the disappearance of the enemy it was originally created to counter, and which has kept nearly 100,000 American soldiers anchored in Europe for two generations. It would have been better to end this book with a chapter on NATO rather than one on the pitifully ephemeral EDC. That would have been a better way to demonstrate the accuracy of McAllister's main thesis–that there has existed since 1945 an ineluctable link between German power in Europe and the American presence there.

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Hubert Zimmermann, *Money and Security: Troops, Monetary Policy, and West Germany's Relations to the United States and the United Kingdom, 1950-1971* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002)

***Reviewed by* Thomas Banchoff, Government, Georgetown University**

Most accounts of German foreign policy during the cold war emphasize its security dimension. The Soviet threat, the American deterrent, and German efforts to combine western integration with *Ostpolitik*–these are the overriding themes. In his important book, *Money and Security*, historian Hubert Zimmermann adopts a very different focus. His thoroughly researched and very well-written monograph explores the economic diplomacy that underlay the US and British troop presence in Germany over the period of 1950-1971. The result is a fine work of contemporary history that both details a little known dimension of postwar German foreign policy and challenges dominant interpretations of the cold war decades.

Zimmermann's overall thesis is that ongoing monetary and security tensions between the Federal Republic and its US and British allies were intimately linked. Economic tensions surrounding the cost of the troop presence in Germany, levels of German defense spending, and the causes and consequences of growing US balance of payments deficits shaped the development of political and military relations in decisive ways. These tensions were most evident in the mid-1960s, when Ludwig Erhard, facing the end of the postwar economic boom, confronted Lyndon Johnson, for his part struggling with the budgetary and political consequences of the Vietnam War. Scholars who have written about this period, mainly political scientists, have acknowledged these balance of payments and burden-sharing controversies as critical issues in postwar US-German relations. Zimmermann tells the story in more detail. But he also convincingly argues that the conflict had its roots in similar monetary and security tensions during the 1950s–tensions that first burdened Anglo-German relations and then, increasingly, transatlantic ties.

It is no doubt true that the money-security nexus goes back to the beginning of the postwar era. And the topic certainly has not received the scholarly attention it deserves. Zimmermann, working with an impressive array of sources, fills an important gap in the literature.

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Nevertheless, his argument is vulnerable in certain respects. Because monetary affairs receive more attention than security affairs in the narrative, the political importance of the former is sometimes exaggerated. The twin shocks of the Korean War and the Berlin Ultimatum, for example, do not receive the attention they deserve. Cold war tensions overshadowed monetary tensions and subordinated them to security concerns through the early 1960s. The subsequent shift toward East-West détente and the dwindling of the perceived Soviet allowed monetary issues to move up the agenda as they did during the mid-1960s. But even then economic differences did not generate an enduring transatlantic political rift. At times, Zimmermann seems to overstate the broader significance of the diplomatic conflicts that he documents.

To his credit, Zimmermann does not claim that economic and financial tensions threatened to destroy Germany's relations with its US and British allies. His study emphasizes instead the interaction of financial and security concerns over time. His account and conclusions are not only of historical interest; with the end of the cold war, economic issues have gained greater salience in transatlantic relations. Trade and monetary tensions between the United States and its European allies now intersect with security issues–the war on terrorism and the war against Iraq–in complex ways. A better understanding of the dynamics of that interaction in the past can enhance our efforts to conceptualize it today. Zimmermann's book is more than an important contribution to the historical literature. As political scientists devote more attention to the economic-security nexus, they can benefit tremendously from carefully documented and tightly argued historical accounts like his.

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